УДК 32.019.52
ББК 60.56
Г 76
М.К. Горшков, А.Л. Андреев, Р.Э. Бараш, Л.Г. Бызов, Л.М. Дробижева,
А.В. Каравай, Н.В. Латова, Ю.В. Латов, Ю.П. Лежнина, С.В. Мареева,
М.М. Мчедлова, В.В. Петухов, Р.В. Петухов, Н.Н. Седова,
И.Н. Трофимова, Н.Е. Тихонова
Российского научного фонда (проект № 14-28-00218)
Руководитель проекта – М.К. Горшков, академик РАН
Книга подготовлена авторским коллективом в составе:
Издание осуществлено при финансовой поддержке
Научный редактор – Н.Н. Никс
Отпечатано в России
ISBN 978-5-7777-0687-4
© Коллектив авторов, 2017
© Институт социологии РАН, 2017
© Оформление. Издательство
«Весь Мир», 2017
Стр.5
ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ
ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
РАЗДЕЛ ПЕРВЫЙ
Социально-экономический контекст жизни россиян:
2014–2016 годы . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Глава 1. Уровень и качество жизни. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Глава 2. Работа: состояние и тенденции в условиях кризиса 34
Глава 3. Влияние кризиса на положение социальнодемографических
групп населения . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Глава 4. Удовлетворенность жизнью: динамика и факторы 76
РАЗДЕЛ ВТОРОЙ
Внешние факторы социальной и политической
трансформации России. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Глава 5. Внешнеполитический дискурс страны
в оценках россиян. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Глава 6. Социокультурные изменения
в структуре массового сознания россиян . . . . . . . . . . 121
Глава 7. Мировой кризис демократии и ее перспективы
в российских «цветах» . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
РАЗДЕЛ ТРЕТИЙ
Современный политический процесс: доверие институтам
и общественно-политическое участие . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Глава 8. Доверие институтам: основные факторы
и социально-политический контекст . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Стр.6
6
Российское общество и вызовы времени. Книга пятая
Глава 9. Кризис доверия к органам местного
самоуправления: причины и пути преодоления . . . . 188
Глава 10. Мировоззренческие установки россиян и их
общественно-политическое участие. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
РАЗДЕЛ ЧЕТВЕРТЫЙ
Сдвиги в массовых настроениях
и ценностных ориентациях россиян. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Глава 11. Динамика политических ценностей россиян –
поворот к консерватизму?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Глава 12. Отношение россиян к советскому прошлому:
постпамять или запрос на будущее? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Глава 13. Потенциал гражданской идентичности в массовом
сознании россиян и оценках экспертного сообщества 271
Глава 14. Религия и общество в современной России:
поиск единства . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
РАЗДЕЛ ПЯТЫЙ
Российское общество: образ будущего . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
Глава 15. Россияне о будущем страны:
старые тревоги и новые надежды. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
Глава 16. «Повестка дня» современной России и видение
ее перспектив ведущими экспертами страны . . . . . . 332
К ИТОГАМ СОЦИОЛОГИЧЕСКОГО МЕГАПРОЕКТА
(вместо заключения) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
CONTENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
SUMMARY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL MEGAPROJECT
(instead of conclusion) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
Стр.7
Russian Society and Challenges of The Time
Book Five
Contributors
M.K. Gorshkov (Editor), A.L. Andreev, R.E. Barash, L.G. Byzov,
L.M. Drobizheva, A.V. Karavay, N.V. Latova, Yu.V. Latov, Yu.P. Lezhnina,
S.V. Mareeva, M.M. Mchedlova, V.V. Petukhov (Editor), R.V. Petukhov,
N.N. Sedova, I.N. Trofimova, N.E. Tikhonova
Contents
Foreword 7
SECTION ONE
Social and economic context of the life of the country’s population:
2014–2016
Chapter 1. Living standards and quality of life of Russians:
2014–2016
Chapter 2. Work in the lives of Russians:
state and trends in crisis conditions
Chapter 3. Impact of the crisis on the position
of social and demographic groups of the population
13
Chapter 4. Satisfaction with life: dynamics and factors
SECTION TWO
External factors of the social and political transformation of Russia
Chapter 5. External political discourse of Russia
in evaluations of Russians
Chapter 6. Sociocultural changes in the structure
of mass consciousness of Russians
13
34
56
76
97
97
Chapter 7. Global crisis of democracy and its prospects
in Russian «colors»141
121
Стр.389
Contents 389
SECTION THREE
Current political process: trust in institutions
and sociopolitical participation
168
Chapter 8. Trust in institutions: main factors and sociopolitical context 168
Chapter 9. Crisis of trust in local government authorities:
reasons and ways to overcome
Chapter 10. Sociopolitical participation of Russians in the context
of their worldview
SECTION FOUR
Shifts in popular attitudes and core values of Russians
Chapter 11. Dynamics of political values of Russians –
a turn to conservatism?
Chapter 12. Attitude of Russians to the Soviet past:
post-memory or aspiration to the future?
Chapter 13. Potential for civil identity in the mass consciousness
of Russians and evaluations of the expert community
SECTION FIVE
Russian society: image of the future
Chapter 15. Russians on the future of the country:
old worries and new hopes
Chapter 16. «Agenda» of present-day Russia and the vision
of its prospects by the country’s leading experts
SUMMARY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL MEGAPROJECT
(Instead of Conclusion)
188
209
235
235
253
271
Chapter 14. Religion and society in present-day Russia: search for unity 287
308
308
332
361
Стр.390
Foreword
Dear reader, you are about to read book five of the publishing series
of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences
(IS RAS), which completes the three-year project of the Russian Science
Foundation (RSF)1 carried out by the Institute’s research group in
2014-2016. The four books published earlier2 were devoted to analyzing
the results of the intermediary stages of the present project obtained
in the course of nationwide sociological studies of monitoring type
performed at an interval of six months (fall 2014, spring and fall 2015,
spring 2016). The empirical basis of this edition was made by the results
of the fifth wave of IS RAS monitoring (fall 2016) and the data of previous
waves, which made it possible to reveal a generalized image of the state
and dynamics of Russian society in crises conditions. At the same time,
the methodology and techniques of all the sociological monitoring waves
were based on the application of complex and contextual approaches to
the study of social phenomena and processes subject to qualitative and
quantitative changes that take place under the influence of internal and
external factors.
Of course, there is a question here: what defined this scientific strategy
adopted by the IS RAS research group? It was first of all the fact that
present-day social dynamics and the complication of social life set higher
requirements for sociological knowledge of a complex, multifaceted
nature. This mainly related to overall analysis and explanation of the state
1 RNF project No. 14-28-00218 «The dynamics of social transformation of modern
Russia’s socioeconomic, political, sociocultural and ethnoreligious contexts».
2 The project’s intermediate fi ndings can be found here: 1) Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy
vremeni. Kniga 1 / Pod. red. M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov [Russian society and challenges of
the time. Book one / M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov – editors] Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir,
2015; 2) Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy vremeni. Kniga 2 / Pod. red. M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov
[Russian society and challenges of the time. Book two / M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov –
editors] Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2015; 3) ) Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy vremeni. Kniga
3. Pod red. M.K. Gorshkov, N.E. Tikhonova [Russian society and challenges of the time. Book
three / M.K. Gorshkov, N.E. Tikhonova – editors]. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2016; 4) )
Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy vremeni. Kniga 4 / Pod. red. M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov
[Russian society and challenges of the time. Book four / M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov –
editors] Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2016.
Стр.391
Foreword 391
and trends of development as separate spheres of life in society and social
changes taking place in it as a whole. This problem is especially relevant
in the context of studying a Russian society that has been going through
contradictory transformation processes for many decades and is still
resolving the question of choosing the vector of its development.
As we know, complex studies of social transformations occurring
in societies of different types, which presuppose and are aimed at
accounting for multifaceted influences and mutual impacts, have
regularly served as the subject of study in different spheres of social
and humanitarian knowledge in recent years. However, they are mostly
focused on inclusiveness and application of a normative and comparative
approach. It is no accident that the best-known and recognized researchand-analytical
and academic studies are those that offer not only and
not so much the data that characterizes the current state of affairs, but
a wide slate of facts and explanatory schemes which take into account
the total of conditions that define the specific nature of social changes on
the whole and in separate aspects – from civilizational and value-based
ones to economic and political ones. However, considering the fact that
comparative projects make it possible to see the general and the specific in
the studied processes and shed light on specific parameters, key features,
and the results of what is going on in particular conditions, they usually
do not record the «peculiarity of the moment” that creates the possibility
to establish the “living face» of each separate studied society.
Turning to comprehensive studies of social transformations in global
science, we should not only emphasize the choice of optimal political
strategies and practices as their dominant theme, but also declare the
necessity of broad consideration of the issue. Considering the possibilities
of combining theoretical interpretation of sociopolitical transformations
with the use of sociological monitoring as the organizational-andmethodological
and analytical basis of their study, we should note as
the most significant projects the ones carried out under the guidance of
R. Inglehart as part of the World Values Survey3.
3 Inglehart R. Modernizatsiya i demokratiya // Demokratoya i modernizatsiya:
k diskussii o vyzovakh XXI veka/ pod. red. V.L. Inozemtsev [Modernization and
Democracy //Democracy and Modernization: Toward Discussion on the Challenges
of the 21st Century / Ed. by V.L. Inozemtsev]. Moscow: Europa, 2010; Inglehart R.F.
Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43
Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997; Inglehart R.F., Norris P. Rising
Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003; Inglehart R.F., Norris P. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics
Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Inglehart R.F., Norris P.
Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World. Cambridge:
Стр.392
392 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
Regarding the correlation between economic, social, political,
ethnic, religious and cultural indicators, the European Social Survey
is of methodological and theoretical interest as it allows us to define
interconnections between changes that take place in social and political
institutions, orientations and beliefs, and also in the dynamics of values
and behavior in European communities and Russia on the basis of
mass surveys conducted in European countries using the method of
S. Schwartz. In the details of this project, a number of works are singled
out that are directly devoted to changes taking place in Russian society4.
However, during the study of identification processes and trends recorded
as part of national and European sociopolitical spaces, emphasis is laid
more on the specific nature of a value system than interconnection and
mutual dependence of different contexts of transformation processes in
Russia.
Considering the above, we should note the availability of
comprehensive interdisciplinary works in the Russian social and
humanitarian field devoted to the analysis of social transformations
taking place in Russia and interpretation of peculiarities of the processes
taking place in it. During the 2000s, studies of social transformations
in the Russian Federation in sociology, political science, and the
socioeconomic field that were carried out through the prism of identity
parameters, possibilities and the specific nature of modernization
processes, and elaboration of trends for effective state policy were
systematically conducted by research groups of IS RAS5.
Cambridge University Press, 2009; Welzel C., Inglehart R.F. Modernization, Cultural
Change and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
4 Rossiya v Evrope: po materialam mezhdunarodnogo sociologicheskigo proekta
«Ebropeiskoe sotsialnoe issledovanie” / Pod. obshei redaktsiei A.V. Andreenkovoi i
L.A. Belyaevoi [Russia in Europe: according to materials of the international sociological
project «European Social Study/ ed. by A.V. Andreenkova, L.A. Belyaeva] М.: Academia,
2009; Lapin N.I. Sveryaem chelovecheskie izmereniya mpodrnizatsii (po rezultatam
tretiei volny Evropeiskogo sotsialnogo issledovaniya, 2006) // Mir Rossii: Sotsiologiya.
Etnologiya.[Let’s reconcile human dimensions of modernization (following the results
of the third wave of the European Social Survey, 2006) // World of Russia. Sociology.
Ethnology] 2011. № 2. С. 33–73 [pp.33-73]; Schwartz S., Butenko T.P., Sedova D.S.,
Lipatova A.S. Utochnennaya teoriya bazovykh individualnykh tsennostei: primenenie
v Rossii// Psikhologia: Zhurnal Vysshei shkoly ekonomiki [Adjusted Theory of basic
individual values: application in Russia // Psychology. Journal of the Higher School of
analiza [Russian identity in the conditions of transformation: experience of sociological
analysis] / Ed. By M.K. Gorshkov, N.E. Tikhonova. Мoscow: Nauka, 2005; Gotovo li
rossiyskoye obschestvo k modernizatsii [Is Russian society ready for modernization] / Ed.
by M.K. Gorshkov, R. Krumm, N.E. Tikhonova. M.: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2010; Dvadtsat
Economics]. 2012. Т. 9. № 2. С. 43–70 [pp.43-70]
5 Rossiskaya identichnost v usloviyakh transformatsii: opyt sociologicheskogo
Стр.393
Foreword 393
If we consider different aspects of social transformations of Russian
society, we may observe an evident shift to inclusion of sociocultural
variables in the analysis field which induce specific political, institutional
and value-based correlations6.
Thus, analysis of the conducted research shows attempts in social
and humanitarian reflection to interpret a wide range of modern trends
associated with the problem of studying the reasons and conditions
for social transformations. At the same time, they display a lack of
a multifaceted contextual analytical approach, which can combine
theoretical-and-conceptual
to determine peculiarities of national social transformations with
establishment of qualitative and quantitative parameters of the state
and dynamics of Russian society using the «here and now» principle.
However, it is the objectives – constantly updated data on the real
influence of socioeconomic, political, sociocultural, ethnoreligious
factors on the nature, features and direction of social transformations in
the country, including their mutual dependence – which are the most
important prerequisite and inseparable condition of successful solving of
relevant problems of elaborating effective state policy aimed at systemic
modernization of society, ensuring its social and civic consolidation. All
this compelled the research group of IS RAS to carry out a large-scale
sociological project aimed at studying the state and dynamics of a Russian
society that is experiencing the simultaneous influence of transformation
processes and crisis conditions in everyday life7. This is a study based on
and
practically
oriented
research work
let reform glazami rossiyan: opyt mnogoletnikh sotsiologicheskikh zamerov [Experience
of many years of sociological measurements] / Ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, R. Krumm and
V.V. Petukhov. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2011; L.M. Drobizheva. Etnichnost v socialnopoliticheskom
prostranstve Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Opyt 20 let. [Ethnicity in the sociopolitical
space of the Russian Federation. Experience of 20 years]. Moscow: Novy Khronograf,
2013; Grazhdanskaya, etnicheskaya i regionalnaya identichnost: vchera, segodnya, zavtra
[Civil, ethnic and regional identity: yesterday, today, tomorrow] / Ed. by L.M. Drobizheva.
Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2013; O chem mechtayut rossiyane [What Russians
dream about: ideal and reality] / Ed. by M.K. Gorshkov, R. Krumm, N.E. Tikhonova.
Moscow: Izdatelstvo Ves Mir, 2013; Gorshkov M.K. Rossiskoe obschestvo kak ono est
(opyt sociologicheskoi diagnostiki) [ Russian society as it is: (experience of sociological
diagnostics)]. In vol. 2, 2nd ed. Moscow: Novy Khronograf, 2016.
6 V.G. Fedotova, V.A. Kolpakov, N.N. Fedotova. Globalny kapitalizm: tri velikie
transformatsii. Socialno-fi losofskii analiz vzaimootnoshenii ekonomiki i obschestva [Global
Capitalism: Three grand transformations. Social and philosophical analysis of relations between
the economy and society]. Moscow: Cultural Revolution Publishers, 2008; Zhiznennyi mir
rossiyan: 25 let spustya (konets 1980- seredina 2010-kh gg.) [World of Russians’ Lives: 25 years
later (late 1980s – mid 2010s)] / Ed. by Zh.T. Toshchenko. Moscow: TsSPiM, 2016.
7 The three-year monitoring program of IS RAS has been prepared and carried out by
the institute’s research group composed of: M.K. Gorshkov (head), V.V. Petukhov (deputy
Стр.394
394 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
an interdisciplinary, complex approach to the analysis of socioeconomic,
political, sociocultural and ethnoreligious processes that takes into account
the true (representative, adequate) reality represented by the monitoringtype
empirical base.
As in previous studies, the total sample size for the fifth wave of
monitoring, completed in October 2016, was 4,000 respondents who
represent the adult population of Russia (aged 18 and older) and are
grouped by gender, age cohort, education level, and type of city/town.
The representativeness of sociological information was ensured
by the use of a multi-stage model of regionalization sampling with
quota selection of units of observation (respondents) at the last stage.
At the first stage, sampling was carried out by the regionalization of
territorial economic regions of the Russian Federation in accordance
with guidelines developed and applied by Rosstat for monitoring
socioeconomic indicators by trend.
The second stage of the sampling includes the selection of typical
subjects of the Russian Federation within each territorial and economic
region. The regionalization structure comprises two megalopolises and
19 other constituent subjects of the Russian Federation.
Megalopolises: Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Territorial and economic regions:
1. Northern Region – Arkhangelsk Region.
2. Northwestern Region – Novgorod Region.
3. Central Region – Moscow Region, Ryazan Region, Yaroslavl Region,
Tula Region.
4. Volga-Vyatka Region – Nizhny Novgorod Region.
5. Central Black Earth Region – Voronezh Region.
6. Volga Region – Republic of Tatarstan, Saratov Region.
7. North Caucasus Region – Rostov Region, Stavropol Territory, North
Ossetia.
8. Ural Region – Sverdlovsk Region, Chelyabinsk Region.
9. West Siberian Region – Kemerovo Region, Novosibirsk Region.
10. East-Siberian Region – Krasnoyarsk Territory, Irkutsk Region.
11. Far Eastern Region – Khabarovsk Territory.
12. Republic of Crimea.
head), I.O. Tyurina (coordinator), A.L. Andreev, V.A. Anikin, E.M. Arutyunova, R.E. Barash,
L.G. Byzov, Yu.A. Gavrilov, L.M. Drobizheva, A.V. Karavay, E.N. Kofanova, I.M. Kuznetsov,
Yu.V. Latov, N.V. Latova, Yu.P. Lezhnina, S.V. Mareeva, M.M. Mchedlova, E.I. Pakhomova,
R.V. Petukhov, N.N. Sedova, E.D. Slobodenyuk, I.N. Trofi mova, N.E. Tikhonova,
A.G. Shevchenko, F.E. Sheregi (selection, primary statistical processing of information).
Стр.395
Foreword 395
The third stage featured further regionalization within the constituent
entities of the Russian Federation, i.e. the division into 5 types of
communities based on the statistical quotas by degree of urbanization:
megalopolises; administrative centers of constituent entities of the
Russian Federation; district administrative centers; urban type
settlements; villages.
At the fourth stage was sampling, i.e. direct selection of respondents for
the survey by interviewers at set quotas. The quotas were mainly observed by
major socio-professional indicators of the respondents8 and ages grouped
into five age cohorts: 18–30 years; 31–40 years; 41–50 years; 51–60 years;
60 years and older.
The nationwide study (fifth wave) and preparation of materials for
the present scientific monograph were undertaken by a working group
composed of: M.K. Gorshkov (head of the study, foreword, conclusion,
general editing), A.L. Andreev (Chapter 6), R.E. Barash (Chapter 12),
L.G. Byzova (Chapter 11), L.M. Drobizheva (Chapter 13), A.V. Karavay
(Chapter 2), Y.V. Latova (Chapters 5, 15), N.V. Latova (Chapter 4), Y.P.
Lezhnina (Chapter 3), S.V. Mareeva (Chapter 1), M.M. Mchedlova
(Chapter 14), V.V. Petukhov (deputy head of the study, Chapters 7, 16,
general editing), R.V. Petukhov (Chapter 9), N.N. Sedova (Chapter 10),
N.E. Tikhonova (Chapter 2), I.N. Trofimova (Chapter 8). Scientific
editor – N. Niks.
8 At the stage of quota selection, an equal share of quotas is observed for the following
socio-professional criteria: 1 – working industries, construction, mines without higher
education; 2 – engineers in industry, construction, mines with higher education; 3 –
employees in trade, catering, services, transportation, public utilities with comprehensive
education (or less), primary and secondary vocational education; 4 – employees of fi nancial
and insurance companies, trade, services, transportation, utilities with higher education;
5 – workers (employees) of universities, schools, healthcare, management (administrative,
political), science, art, media, higher education; 6 – employees (technicians, operators,
librarians, secretaries, nurses, and others) of universities, schools, healthcare, management
(administrative, political), science, media, comprehensive or secondary vocational
education; 7 – military, Ministry of Internal Aff airs workers, customs, tax services with any
education; 8 – students of secondary and higher education institutions; 9 – inhabitants of
villages and settlements.
Стр.396
Summary of the sociological megaproject
(instead of conclusion)
Considering that the fifth wave of IS RAS monitoring completed
the three-year
appropriate not only to present the main conclusions based on the results
obtained in the course of its realization but also address the conclusions
of a contextual and general nature that reveal the distinctive features of
Russian society that manifested themselves in 2014–2016.
As shown by results of the first wave of monitoring (October 2014),
research period of
the RNF project,
it would be
the basic factors underlying the functioning of modern Russian society
have not undergone either any considerable transformations or any
situational changes at the start of the crisis that could have disrupted
the overall community lifestyle, produced a decadent mass mentality,
or provoked widespread protests and public distrust towards state
institutions. On the contrary, the desire of a number of leading Western
countries to «punish» Russia for its reunification with Crimea, with the
support of the Russian-speaking population in southeast Ukraine, caused
a rise in society of a patriotism, and even to some extent consolidation
of ideologically opposing social groups and political movements of
Russian citizens. As for the context of the present time, the survey revealed
the following key characteristics and indicators:
• regardless of all the gravity and criticism with which the situation
in the country is being evaluated, the state of Russians’ social
well-being has not fallen below the parameters characteristic
of the previously observed periods of social stabilization and
destabilization;
• the conflicting judgments that the people widely used to identify
the problems in everyday life turned out to be mainly linked to
understanding the co-dependence between the internal and
external factors mediating the nature of the social environment;
• mass consciousness underwent a change of priorities that touched
upon evaluation of the main sources of threats for Russia: while
in 2013 internal threats were dominating in the eyes of our fellow
citizens, the focus of public attention shifted to external threats
in the fall of 2014;
Стр.397
Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 397
• in Russians’ opinion, all the events and processes that could
present a potential danger to the country were joined together by
a single link, i.e. the Ukrainian crisis: Russia’s forced involvement
in the situation, as well as NATO’s eastward expansion and
the related rise in international tension, had begun to form,
according to Russian citizens, the basis for the agenda reflecting
the most dangerous trends;
• the attitude of various segments of the population to Western
sanctions against Russia was restrained and was predetermined
by the respondents’ habitual lifestyle and established level of
consumption. At the same time, the willingness of society to
economize and the public’s support of measures intended to
strengthen Russia was quite high.
In general, as shown by the survey in the fall of 2014, the specific
socioeconomic, spiritual, and psychological capabilities of Russian
society that had emerged in the previous decade largely contributed to
the mass population segments’ reserved attitude to the new reality, which
mitigated the acuteness of arising problems.
The second wave of monitoring (March 2015) was aimed at studying
the consequences of the most acute phase of the economic crisis in
the context of analyzing everyday life of Russian citizens. The obtained
data made it clear that in the fall of 2014, the mindset of Russians and
their attitude towards authority were mostly defined by an external
political agenda, and by the spring of 2015, the nature of their perception
of the situation in the country started to change, though not materially
so. These changes were prompted by the economic crisis as well as by
the first impacts of the sanctions imposed against Russia and the antiWestern
countersanctions on its part. Even though the numerous
predictions of foreign experts that the country were to enter mid-2015 in
a state of economic collapse and social depression did not come true,
overall anxiety did intensify.
In the conditions of the current (in the same way as the previous)
economic crisis, the most widespread form of its impact on the everyday
lives of Russians was an increase in prices that involved a larger part of
the country’s population than the one that occurred in 2008-2009, and
was comparable by the degree of pain to the situation of 1998-1999. While
in the spring of 2015, the problem of rising prices was seen more acutely by
our fellow citizens than in the past, difficulties at work involved a relatively
smaller part of them than six years ago. Even so, between the fall of 2014
and the spring of 2015, the fear of unemployment counted among the key
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398 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
«sore spots» of Russian society. Given the low rate of dismissals and real
unemployment, this fear was most likely of a socio-psychological nature
and could be explained, on the one hand, by the sheer dread of being left
with no means of livelihood and minimal unemployment benefits and, on
the other hand, the fact that the majority of Russians lack the necessary
savings that would make it possible to make ends meet until another job
is found.
It has also been revealed that representatives of various professional
groups employ different strategies when adapting to new living conditions,
in particular when diversifying their income. For example, one-time
jobs – the practice of adapting to the hardships of life that «overtakes»
a second job in this respect, which is traditionally popular and widespread
in different professional communities – turned out to be more typical of
manual workers in the crisis conditions. At the same time, white-collar
workers with a higher education started to resort to finding a second job
more often than the representatives of other groups.
As the social and sociopolitical situation in the country was quite
tense in the spring of 2015, Russians felt more anxious than ever.
The shifts that were revealed in the mental and emotional state of
the population were driven by the vast majority, which felt either calm
and composed or anxious and tense, while barely affecting those who
perceive almost all the social situations in the country through the prism
of «catastrophic consciousness». At the same time, there were no signs
of panic in the social «niches» against this background. The crisis phase
from October 2014 to March 2015 did not reach the depths that could
have triggered additional social tension, ready to turn into real protest
sentiments and actions. Moreover, national consolidation and the mass
surge of patriotism, noted above, that were brought about by the antiRussian
sanctions and the conduct of the Western political leaders during
the celebrations dedicated to the 70th anniversary of victory in the Great
Patriotic War, as well as the relatively mild losses in the crisis period,
resulted in different population groups beginning to display signs of new
cultural patterns aimed at the mobilization of national resources.
It was established during the second stage of research that Russian
society entered a new loop of crisis with well-established zones of
institutional trust and mistrust. The zone of trust was formed by
the institutions that are perceived by Russians as caring for general wellbeing
and are associated with the ideas of integrity, unity, stability, and
security. Russians tend to link these concepts to the presidency, the army,
and the Church. The zone of mistrust was formed by the institutions
associated in the mass consciousness with pursuing private (group,
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Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 399
territorial, industrial, party) interests. Interestingly enough, the level of
trust in the institutions that form the middle zone is the most unstable,
being strongly influenced by current events and processes.
The choice to trust the baseline state institutions makes it possible
to say that the institutional trust existing in Russian society is not only
hierarchical but also holistic, which to a certain degree «compensates»
for its uneven distribution among the population. A lower level of trust in
most state institutions is primarily observed among the socially active and
resource-endowed groups of our fellow countrymen, such as the young
and wealthy, self-sufficient Russians.
The results yielded during the second stage of the project have also
allowed us to evaluate the current state of civic activism in Russia; we
had reason to believe that, despite the crises period, civic activism has
solid growth potential, primarily due to it becoming more and more
subjective. The main «bearers» of civic activism are people with an
active stance on their own being and future, and with a range of diverse
ambitions in different spheres (especially concerning education, selffulfillment,
social communication). These people are inclined towards
non-conformity, initiative, and enterprise, and readiness to fight for their
rights and to change their surroundings for the better.
At the same time, data from the survey conducted in the spring of
2015 showed that the level of real political involvement of Russian citizens
was not practically growing regardless of aggravation or some attenuation
of signs of crisis. Just as in previous years, it reached no more than 1%.
It is important in this context to consider the level of social activism
of youth aged 18 to 30, which exceeds similar indicators of other age
cohorts: 16% of young Russians representing this age group confirmed
that they are members of Internet communities, while 7% said they take
part in volunteer campaigns, and two 4% groups said that they contribute
to environmental and charitable organizations, respectively.
The study has reaffirmed the established truth: despite the crisis,
the previously formed prerequisites for the development of important
public trends are still going strong, even in difficult social and economic
conditions. Russia is opening a wide range of possibilities for civic selforganization
based on Internet communication. Due to growing access to
the Internet, civic activists are capable of creating a network of multiple
resources aimed at the development of grassroots solidarity practices.
Authorities of different levels are using the mechanisms of «electronic
democracy» more and more actively, initiating the creation of different
platforms for civic activity and direct communication with the public.
There is also a certain correlation between Russians’ involvement in
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400 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
different communication channels, on the one hand, and their life
strategies and social and political practices.
And finally, as convincingly demonstrated by the results of the
second wave of our sociological monitoring, Russian society has been
dynamically (from a historical point of view) moving towards a modern
consumer society, where the population’s dependence on the government
is being gradually reduced, while personal and individual interests start
prevailing over the public ones. Thus, over the four-year period, the share
of those in absolute need of state support fell from 66% to 56% (2011 and
spring 2015 data, respectively). At the same time, we see a 10% increase
in the number of Russians who rely on their own efforts (34% versus
44%, respectively).
As could have been expected, this self-sufficient part of society is
mainly comprised of the young and wealthy Russian citizens, in addition
to those characterized by having a definite set of achievable life goals and
striving for self-fulfillment. This is probably the main reason behind the
positive social and psychological mood of those Russians who can solve
their problems without state support.
The desire to be self-sufficient has no direct connection with
opposing the state. This is expressed even by those respondents who
work for the state on a professional basis (military personnel, civil
servants, employees of law enforcement agencies, etc.). In this case,
the sociological analysis has identified, despite the crisis conditions,
a significant advance, rather than the completion, of society’s adaptation
to the economic and political reality of present-day Russia, and has
helped reveal an emerging new subject of economic and sociopolitical
action, which, in the circumstances under consideration, is capable of
moving to the forefront of public life’s key events and processes.
The third wave of monitoring was carried out in October 2015. Its
results showed that by the end of 2015, the tension in mass consciousness
and sensitivity of citizens to the factors threatening the country were
still high. The population still perceived an outside enemy as the main
negative force at hand and the target of all potential blame; society has
adapted to economic adversity by falling back on the familiar formula,
«Anything but war». Judging by the «hot spots» of international conflict,
this formula could be considered quite significant.
As for the population’s economic status, it froze at a stable, low level
in 2015. While the average individual and household income did not drop
(and even increased slightly) during the crisis year, this growth failed to
counteract the effects of inflation. In addition, income dynamics were
different across various income groups: during the past year, the average
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Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 401
income in the lower decile did not decrease, while the average income
in the upper decile fell. This, at least in part, helped mitigate excessive
income inequality, which was confirmed by statistical and sociological
data as well. At the same time, the financial status of respondents from
the two upper deciles still remained drastically different from that of the
rest of the population, even with the negative income dynamics in mind.
As a result, the more affluent population groups were not as likely to
state that they had been affected either by the crisis in general or by its
most widespread forms, in particular, linked to a higher cost of living and
lower income. Such reaction occurred because the economic well-being
of their representatives is driven not only by their current income (as is
the case with less well-off Russians) but also by a more general range of
opportunities and resources, which allows them to mitigate the negative
influence of economic crises on their lifestyle.
The crisis continued to impact the majority of the Russian population,
mainly through the considerable increase in prices that accompanied it.
At the same time, comparative analysis of sociological research results
has let us conclude that the current crisis affected the Russian population
in a far less painful way than the 2009 crisis. This was manifested by
a lower outreach of structural problems connected to the labor market, as
well as by the way the public evaluated the damage done to them by the
crisis. It was most often characterized as serious, but not catastrophic.
Such definitions may also be explained, in particular, by the fact
that living through a year-long economic recession did not bring about
any changes related to a qualitative deterioration of Russian citizens’
financial «safety buffer». Such factors as owning property and real estate,
indicators related to having savings and credit, and the types of Russians’
main income sources overall remained fairly stable. On the other hand,
this «safety buffer» had not been too resilient even during the years before
the crisis, which were characterized by fairly sustainable social and
economic development; and quite naturally, it did not grow any stronger
during the crisis.
As highlighted by our study, the optimization of losses during
the crisis proved to be most challenging for the employed population
of Russia’s rural areas. Throughout the past year, worker dismissals
in villages became widespread; employable members of one in every
seven rural households had trouble finding stable jobs. As a result, an
overwhelming majority of the rural labor force started working overtime,
while payment for such work became far less frequent. The practice of
relying on household gardens or farms has mostly been abandoned in
Russian villages. In any case, even after a year-long crisis, accompanied
Стр.402
402 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
by increasing rates of rural unemployment, household gardens or farms
remained among one of the key sources of financial support for less than
40% of village families, while selling home-grown farm produce was
a common practice for just a small percentage of rural households. This
allows us to conclude that Russian rural areas are becoming dominated
by the urbanized model of employment.
The current crisis has brought focus to the problem of resource
availability to the Russian population. People with access to a large range
of resources had a sizable «safety buffer» at the start of the crisis and
consequently experienced the smallest financial loss, even though their
actual income level dropped more dramatically than that of other groups.
However, this does not mean that they had fewer problems. The point
here is that the impact of the crisis on the high-resource group of Russians
turned out to be far more complex and multifaceted. The forms of this
impact include not only the rising prices and falling income (the main
source of problems for the rest of the population) but also changes in
the working environment that involved many of them. And even though
this group’s «safety buffer», which includes professional qualifications
and social resources, has so far allowed its members to negate the adverse
effects that the economic crisis had on their standard of living, this does
not mean that the high-resource group is doing absolutely fine. On
the contrary, it is this large, financially well-off group of the Russian
population, which mostly resides in the two megalopolises, that has
turned out to be the only one to become affected (and quite adversely) by
the crisis not so much in terms of the quality of life as in terms of one’s
customary lifestyle.
Low-resource groups of Russians, in turn, have suffered from
the crisis more than the average Russian, even despite surpassing all
other groups as far as nominal income growth is concerned. First,
the lack of not only economic but also any other resources that may
boost a person’s resilience to crises in today’s Russia left them without
means to compensate for the drop in their actual income. Second, due
to the low quality of human capital, these groups were the first to suffer
the consequences of negative changes in the labor market by losing
their work income. Third, the complete absence or low quality of social
resources has not allowed the low-resource population groups to cope
with the crisis with the help of their own social networks.
As revealed by the third wave results of the IS RAS monitoring,
the economic crisis has worsened the issue of Russians’ mass perception
of inequality: in the fall of 2015, only 3% of the respondents agreed with
the statement that Russia does not suffer from deep social inequality,
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Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 403
while 9% claimed that they had never been affected by any type of social
inequality. As we analyzed the dynamics of perception of the kinds of
inequality typical of Russian society, our studies revealed that over
the past two years, people have been noting a sharp rise in their severity.
Out of the above, the issue that Russians currently consider to be most
painful is income inequality (which is hardly surprising, given that income
inequality in modern Russia not only presents a significant problem on its
own but also serves as a driving force behind a whole range of additional
types of non-financial inequality that many people suffer from).
The crisis year has not failed to affect the well-being of various
social categories, in particular, the middle class and the poor. In fact,
the next stage of monitoring has shown that during the 2014-2015 crisis,
the number of the poor in Russia doubled when compared to the years
before the crisis (2012-2013), amounting to as much as a quarter of the
total population in the fall of 2015.
As part of the fourth wave of the project (March 2016), the research
strategy was aimed at detection of relatively well-established features of
Russian society that characterize the everyday practices of our fellow
citizens in the context of a continuing crisis, not only in the socioeconomic
sphere but in other spheres of life as well.
Considering that the immanent characteristic of any kind of human
activity is the psychoemotional component, it was important to evaluate
the social and psychological dynamics of Russian society in the crisis
period. The obtained data showed that after a slight improvement in
the common estimates of the situation in Russia at the end of 2015, spring
2016 was marked by a new surge of widespread anxiety. The number of
Russians describing the situation as «tense» rose, while the number of
those who believed that everything was under control fell. At the same
time, there were no changes in the share of dire pessimists, apologists of
catastrophic consciousness who are inclined to treat every situation in
the country as something little short of an apocalypse (8-9%). Overall,
as was shown by the results of previous waves of monitoring, the 2014
crisis was highly reminiscent of the 2008 crisis, although in a less tense,
more “watered down» version: we could observe gradual rising of tension
in the country, but at a slightly slower pace.
It should be noted that evaluation of the domestic environment in
Russia as of spring 2016 corresponds to evaluation of the most recent
period. While in the fall of 2015, Russians’ public consciousness
exhibited a certain rise in optimism driven by certain social and
economic stabilization, it became evident in the six months to follow
that stabilization had only been temporary, and as the latest negative
Стр.404
404 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
dynamics of exchange rates brought about a further increase in prices,
society once again had to re-evaluate its achievements. Consequently,
a poorer general estimate of the changes that had occurred in the country
over the past year was the result of unfulfilled hopes for the crisis to grow
less pronounced.
That said, the relatively pessimistic attitude towards the current
situation and what the country had to live through a year ago was
somewhat mitigated by the people’s predictions of Russia’s progress in
the near future. And even though the share of negative attitudes decreased
due to them being replaced by vague opinions like «Nothing will change»
(as opposed to rising optimism), the very fact that society’s psychological
and emotional state is characterized by fewer unequivocally negative
predictions allows us to say the following: the population is not growing
desperate and continues to hope for the better.
The «safety buffer» that Russians had built up over the years of
economic stability allowed them to keep a sustainable balance between
a positive and negative social and mental state. However, by the spring of
2016, the crisis had upset the scales, leading to the dominance of negative
social and psychological attitudes (granted, it was slight, but still dominant).
And even though this shift is incomparable to the attitudes during
the 1998 crisis (when negative social and psychological attitudes were
expressed by 90% of the population, as opposed to 53% today), it may
still be considered a symptom heralding the need to pay closer attention
to the current state and dynamics of Russians’ opinions.
A sociological test of Russians’ overall mental state, operationalized
by its indicators, allows us to somewhat smooth over the prevalence
of negativity over positivity in society. On the one hand, the data for
the spring of 2016 was less positive when compared to the fall of 2015
(i.e., less people felt calm and emotionally uplifted, and the number of
those experiencing irritation grew). But on the other hand, there was not
that much negativity compared to the data collected throughout 2015.
Moreover, the most toxic moods (aggression, bitterness, aggravation)
remained at the same level as in 2014. There was only one aspect that saw
a significant change for the worse: far more Russians started displaying
feelings of indifference, apathy, and depression (here, the figures
doubled). That said, even though such attitudes are definitely negative, at
least they do not lead to destructive behavior.
The fourth wave results showed that Russians’ overall
social
and psychological inclinations continued to be less than optimistic.
The negative characteristics that distinguished it in the fall of 2015
were not just preserved but even slightly intensified: only one-third of
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Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 405
the population responded positively to their environment. More than half
of all Russians believed that their loved ones were experiencing negative
emotions such as uneasiness, irritation, and resentfulness. More negative
estimates of loved ones’ social circumstances and state of mind were, first
and foremost, observed among the most deprived part of the population,
i.e. those in worse financial circumstances and with fewer opportunities
to tackle their difficulties on their own, as well as with more reasons to
grow bitter if they fail.
If we bring together all available information on Russians’ personal
social and mental state, as well as on the state of the people around them,
we will see that the general picture of society’s emotional attitudes is
increasingly negative. Other factors (such as evaluation of the domestic
situation or the financial status of Russian citizens) also demonstrate
that Russians have come to understand that the crisis is severe and likely
here to stay. All the same, realizing this does not necessarily mean that
the population has resigned itself to this fate. The year 2015, with its relative
stability, gave Russians a chance to take a closer look at the situation
and to reallocate the resources at their disposal in a way that would help
them minimize their losses by (perhaps temporarily) denying themselves
the things they could live without and focusing instead of what was vital
for their survival.
Given the current turbulence in society, it is quite clear why the key
problems concerning Russians are those that directly affect their everyday
lives. In the spring of 2016, the vast majority of Russians continued to feel
anxious about rising prices for goods and services, rising utility fees, and
the diminishing quality of life experienced by a large number of people
in the country. The five key challenges faced by Russians also included
unemployment and the limited availability of free social services. The rest
was not considered by the population to be that important.
It is worth noting that foreign policy issues or the general prospects
for society’s development are of the least concern to Russians: they are
mostly on the mind of the more affluent segments of the population.
In turn, personal difficulties linked to material resources are perceived
somewhat less painfully in megalopolises and cities with a population
over one million, as opposed to all the other types of communities. At the
same time, unlike people in other communities, their residents express
a relatively higher concern about factors governing the quality and safety
of life in big cities.
In the second year, the crisis began to have a substantial impact
on Russians’ everyday lives, with the majority of the population being
affected one way or another. Just like during the initial stage of the crisis,
Стр.406
406 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
the people that continued to be affected the most come from highly
disadvantaged groups with low income. In these conditions, saving one’s
income has become the most popular adaptation strategy. In the spring
of 2016, only 13% of the population did not start reducing their expenses,
either because they did not want to or they felt no need to. The remaining
87% of Russians admitted that the crisis had forced them to change their
habitual consumption patterns. Our research reveals that in most cases
people started saving on clothes, shoes, food, and vacations. Furthermore,
around 40% of Russians also started cutting down on everyday leisure
activities and on purchases of costly durable goods.
When faced with a crisis, Russians do not economize solely on
consumption; their desire to cut their expenses also had quite a significant
impact on the investments in human resources development (i.e.
education and healthcare services, meaningful and adequate rest), which
may compromise the country’s overall talent potential.
It became evident by the end of the second year of the crisis that
possible adaptation of employed Russians to the crisis is largely hindered
by adverse workplace conditions. In fact, it is one of the main consequences
of the current crisis. As was convincingly shown by the results of the third
and fourth waves of monitoring, employment problems are expressed in
various forms: dismissals followed by unemployment, difficulties with
finding new work, the widespread practice of sending workers on unpaid
leave and delaying wages, violations of labor laws, including a larger share
of “under the table” jobs, etc.
Even though the official unemployment figures for 2014-2016 remain
quite modest, the high labor turnover in Russia is now combining with
prolonged, stagnant periods of unemployment. In the spring of 2016, one
in every two unemployed Russians had been looking for a job for more
than six months. This issue is especially relevant for rural communities.
While in urban areas, people who had been unemployed for a long time
did end up finding work in 80% of cases or more, in rural settlements
these figures amounted to less than 50%. It is also essential to add that
stagnant unemployment is most typical in the polar opposite age cohorts,
i.e. of young people aged 18 to 30 and of people just about to reach
the retirement age.
Another fact that merits special attention is the finding that during
the second year of the crisis, the number of households that included
unemployed senior citizens rose by 15%. Bearing in mind the partial
(compared to inflation rates) indexation of retirement payments,
this trend leads to a reduction in the quality of life for a large share of
the population.
Стр.407
Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 407
Even though the negative consequences of the crisis related to
the aforementioned employment issues are glaringly obvious, from
a comprehensive sociological diagnosis point of view, they are not among
the key factors determining the nature of the 2014–2016 crisis. The main
adverse consequence of the crisis, which the participants of the IS RAS
research group agreed on, is the systemic change in the relations between
employers and employees, with the focus shifting to the latter becoming
even further disenfranchised. What we are dealing with here is not so
much employees being deprived of their rights (primarily, the right to
hold strikes) as employers failing to respect the rights that, in theory, their
workers still possess. Sociological studies show that this failure mostly
takes the form of refusing to pay for overtime work or sick and maternity
leave, as well as prolonging the work week in a way that violates the law,
taking administrative measures to force workers to go on unpaid leave,
and reducing the share of wages paid within the legal framework.
On the whole, IS RAS monitoring shows that in 2016 half of Russia’s
working population was, in one way or another, outside the framework
of the labor, retirement, and social legislation of the Russian Federation.
The social protection issues mostly concerned employed people living in
the so-called «lesser Russia» (villages, urban type settlements, and towns
with a population under 100,000). Considering the obtained data, there
are reasons to say that the self-professed employers (as well as so-called
effective managers) are trying to rebuild the domestic economy and
overcome the typical issues of today at the expense of their employees
by increasing their workload and jeopardizing their social security at
the same time.
Starting the fifth wave of this project (October 2016), the research
improve in the current year, and there were just as many opposing ones
which said that the country would be taken by a second wave of crisis.
However, the results of the survey showed that quite considerable positive
changes occurred in the attitudes of Russians by October 2016.
For the first time in the past two years, assessment by the Russian
that
the socioeconomic situation would
team proceeded from the fact that two years had passed since the start of
the 2014 crisis. During these years, as was shown by previous sociological
measurements, there was still uncertainty in society: until the fall of
2016, there were forecasts
population of the situation in the country approached the baseline
characteristics of the beginning of the crisis. The share of those who
perceived it as tense and crisis-driven still exceeded half of the population
of the Russian Federation (56%), but this indicator almost coincided
with the same indicator from October 2014 (53%) and was better than
Стр.408
408 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
the value from 2011 (59%). At the same time, we could observe an
increase in the share of Russians with positive attitudes. Thus, Russians
seem to have adapted to the new economic reality and the crisis started to
lose its acuteness and importance, at least in the mass consciousness.
The evaluation of the current domestic environment in the country
corresponds to the evaluation of the past year’s changes. In March
2016, another negative change in the currency rate and ensuing rise
in prices contributed to more pessimistic evaluations of Russian
achievements by the population, but six months later (in October 2016)
we could see considerable positive shifts: one-third of the country’s
population (30%) noted improvement in the situation, while its
deterioration was identified by just a little more than one-half of Russians
(51% versus 70% in the spring of 2016). Nevertheless, if we compare
the obtained image with the one recorded in 2013, it becomes evident
that the socioeconomic situation that developed in the country in the fall
of 2016 is evaluated by society in a much more critical way than the one
that occurred three years ago.
The fifth wave showed a negative perception not only in the state of
the economic sphere of societal life but also its moral climate, the nature
of international relations, the tendencies of democratic development in it,
and the state of affairs in the social sphere. The only exception is fighting
terrorism. According to respondents, the positive changes of the past
three years in this sphere evidently prevail over the negative ones. There
were also positive changes in mass evaluations of the results of fighting
corruption by our fellow countrymen.
The survey showed that society maintains a relative balance between
the positive and negative social and psychological state. At the start of
2016, the scale began to unbalance: the negative variant of the latter started
to prevail among the population (insignificantly, though). Nevertheless,
by the end of 2016 balance was restored and the everyday lives of Russian
citizens were once again dominated by positive moods. Practically every
other respondent declared that he/she felt calm and poised. The share
of people with anxiety about the future dropped considerably for a short
period from March to October 2016 (from 29% to 23%), and we also
recorded no increase in extreme manifestations of social discontent
(annoyance, bitterness, and aggression).
One of the important features of mass consciousness is the difference
in a person’s perception of their own life and what they see around
themselves personally or through the media. For many years, Russians
perceive their close environment in a considerably more favorable light
than everything beyond it. Thus, if 52% of those polled evaluate their
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Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 409
social and psychological state in a positive way, the way the people
around them feel is seen as positive by only 34%. But a positive trend
is also observed here: six months ago, more than half of Russians noted
express negative feelings in the social space that surrounded them
(anxiety – 31%, annoyance, bitterness and aggression – 26%), with their
share reduced by the end of 2016, although not significantly.
The indicator of the trend toward an improving situation in Russia
is changes in respondents’ evaluations of social tension in society. It is
entirely natural that any crisis reduces the general feeling of comfort in
life and leads to growing tension, and this picture could be observed in
Russian society in the crisis of 2008–2009. In just those six months, the
share of those who felt social tension rose from 59% to 83%. In the period
from March 2015 to March 2016, growing tension in society was noted by
about 61–64% of the population, which is considerably less than in 2009,
but still involves almost two-thirds of the country’s population.
However, we could observe positive shifts in this matter by October
2016: the share of those who noted that tension was rising a little or
considerably dropped to 52% (the lowest indicator against the backdrop
of the past two crises). At the same time, the share of those who have
a different opinion nearly doubled (from 12% in March 2016 to 21% in
October 2016). At the same time, we could see a constantly rising share
of supporters of neutral evaluations who thought that the situation in
the country is not changing for the better or for the worse.
The results of the fifth wave of monitoring confirmed that evaluation
of the impact of the crisis is tightly connected with material standing,
and even to a higher degree with its subjective evaluation: for instance,
the share of those who evaluate personal damage done by the crisis as
quite considerable was the highest among those who have income below
half of the regional median (12%), and also among those who perceive
their material standing as bad (15%). A clear relationship was also revealed
between evaluation of damage done by the crisis and the general social
and psychological state of Russians: among those who evaluated damage
from the crisis as catastrophic, 39% experienced fear and concerns
regarding the future of the country, while the share of such people among
those unaffected by the crisis is just 5%. 82% of those who considered
the impact of the crisis to be catastrophic were uncertain about their
future, with only a quarter of those practically unaffected by the crisis
sharing this view.
Rising prices and a drop in the real income of Russians continued
to lead to the fact that saving their income was becoming a widespread
strategy of adapting to the new economic conditions. And though in
Стр.410
410 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
the fall of 2016, a little more than a quarter of Russians (27%) noted that
there was no need for them to start saving as a result of the crisis, changes
in economic conditions for the rest still resulted in a change in traditional
consumption models in one or several spheres.
The most frequent items for saving included clothes and shoes (53%
among the whole population and 72% among those who cut expenses),
food (43% and 59%, respectively) and vacations (43% and 59%). At
the same time, Russians started to save on vacations and expensive
durable goods on a mass scale. The «rating» of items for saving practically
has not changed in the past six months: in the spring of 2016, it was
also dominated by the purchase of products that can satisfy basic needs
(clothes, shoes, and food), followed by items related to vacationing,
leisure and durable goods.
The majority of representatives in all income groups of the population
were involved in saving. However, its intensity did differ depending on
material standing. Absolutely all items of saving were more frequently
used by the groups with the worst material standing. On average, their
representatives used 3.7 out of 9 possible saving options, while the most
favored group used 2.1.
Thus, saving their income is the dominant strategy of population
adaptation to the new crisis reality. However, it should be taken into
account that it has involved the overwhelming majority of Russians to
some extent, particularly the least well-off. The question of the possibility
for further cutting back on consumption, especially without considerable
damage to the human resources of the country’s population, remains
open. It is telling that those who started to save on something speak more
frequently about saving as a potential adaptation strategy (56% of them
are ready to continue to cut down on their expenses, if necessary, versus
36% of those that still have not resorted to any economizing).
As for the second most widespread adaptation strategy, the search
for additional sources of income, 46% of Russians are hypothetically
ready to resort to it. However, it should be taken into account for realistic
evaluation of the provided value that in the fall of 2016, a second job was
one of the main sources of income for just 4% of the working population,
one-time earnings for 14% more, and these shares did not change in
2016. Thus, despite the fact that a considerable share of Russians declare
their readiness to adapt to the crisis by searching for additional sources
of income, the data on the real situation testifies to the rarity of this
adaptation strategy in practice.
Income from property, property rental, and interest on deposits was
received by only 3% of the population in the fall of 2016, which also casts
Стр.411
Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 411
doubt on the possibility to practically apply the strategies declared by
them to rent out their property or live on savings made.
We should note the fact that the general rating of the supposed
strategies of adaptation to the crisis, as well as shares of the population that
choose particular variants of these strategies, practically have not changed
over the two years of the crisis. The most noticeable changes (that did
not influence the general image) touched upon the strategies of turning
to relatives for help: the share of those who did not exclude such options
fell from 20% to 16%. This is not surprising, considering that 15% of
the population had to start saving on material aid provided earlier.
At the same time, there was an increased share of those who plan
to rely on the strategy of self-sustainment with food from a household
garden or farm. The data on the main sources of Russians’ income
testifies to the fact that they actually started to use their household garden
or farm more frequently as a result of the crisis: in the fall of 2016, about
20% of the population included it among the main sources, and this
share doubled in comparison with the fall of 2014. In case of further
deterioration in material standing, the last two strategies were mainly
mentioned by representatives of the least well-off population groups.
Thus, reducing expenses remained the main adaptation mechanism both
according to respondents’ statements and in reality.
With all the situational and contextual importance of the provided
evaluations and conclusions that characterize Russian society in crisis
conditions, they motivate the reasoning on basic problems of functioning
of present-day Russian society. Moreover, considering their representative
verification, they compel us to have a deeper approach to the study of
the correlation between, on the one hand, stable and fundamental and,
on the other hand, dynamic and changeable constructions of Russian
society. In one way or another, analysis of the results of all five waves
of monitoring makes it necessary to use sociological diagnostics and
address the problems of the everyday priorities of today’s Russians,
evaluate the models of world perception existing in society, particularly
in the paradigms of the traditional and the modern, correlate them with
the existing system of regulations and values, and also understand how
the ethnic, national and religious characteristics of Russian society fit
into the new reality.
If we talk about sociological diagnostics of international relations, it
should be emphasized that, despite the crisis in Russian society, many
people expressed a generally favorable opinion: 45% of respondents
describe inter-ethnic relations across the country as friendly and smooth,
40% as seemingly smooth but internally tense, and 14% as tense and on
Стр.412
412 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
the verge of possible conflict. Interestingly enough, when it comes to
evaluating inter-ethnic relations in the particular area where they live,
Russians’ responses prove far more positive. This is quite understandable
since respondents evaluate these relations based on their personal
experience, while in order to consider inter-ethnic relations in Russia as
a whole, they have to rely on the media (mostly television).
The
influenced by the status of Russians’ national identity. The process of its
emergence and development, which was boosted in the early 2000s, has
yielded positive results, contradicting the logic of economic recession.
For instance, IS RAS monitoring shows that between 2013 and 2016 as
many as 74–84% of the population experienced a feeling of unity with
the rest of their countrymen.
A sustained sense of unity with other Russians, focus on the state’s
scope
of
inter-ethnic
unity and consolidation is
largely
importance, a stable level of trust towards the government and one’s
fellow citizens – all of these factors essentially reveal the rise of a new type
of civic identity. The second decade of the 21st century, and especially
the years 2014 and 2015, which were marked by such momentous events
as the Sochi Olympics and the return of Crimea, shed light on the fact
that Russian society is steadily consolidating.
The sense of unity with other Russians is not expressed too differently
across various age cohorts, though it is slightly more pronounced if we
look at people over 50 (75–77% compared to 69% of 18- to 30-yearolds).
Similarly, solidarity with other Russians is declared by nearly equal
shares of people with different education levels. It is also worth adding
that those Russians who identify themselves as «people of Russia» express
feelings of love towards their country and take reverent pride in its modern
achievements far more frequently. At the same time, they are open to
cooperation with people of different ethnicities: over 80% of them believe
that «the government must nurture the culture of every ethnic group in
the country». What is more, the share of people who put their trust in
federal authorities (first and foremost, the president and the government)
is higher among respondents with a strong sense of civic identity. Thus,
the expert opinion that civic identity is a resource that brings Russians
together, greatly contributing to boosting their confidence in the future,
is confirmed when we analyze Russians’ public consciousness.
In these conditions, ethnic solidarity acts as a key social resource,
helping bring the community together. It serves Russians as a basis for
fostering feelings of patriotism, social optimism, and loyalty towards the
country and the government. Despite some expert opinions, for most
respondents, solidarity with other people of their ethnicity does not
Стр.413
Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 413
contradict their sense of identity as Russians in any way; on the contrary,
the two identities harmoniously coexist. Among those ethnic Russians
who name love as their main feeling towards the country, the share of
ethnic solidarity exceeds 80%. For Russians belonging to other ethnic
groups, ethnic solidarity is higher in groups who name pride as their main
feeling towards Russia.
It is worth noting that, regardless of ethnicity, the feeling of solidarity
is lower in groups that experience unease and frustration: the share of
people experiencing the feeling of ethnic solidarity drops to 60-65%
among respondents who describe their everyday mood as «indifference
and apathy».
That is to say, those Russians who support the notion of ethnic
(«today every person must
solidarity
feel united with their ethnic
community») exhibit a more positive and optimistic view of the
country’s development, are more loyal to the government and society,
love their homeland, and are proud to be Russian. When compared to
other groups, ethnic Russians with a strong sense of identity are more
inclined to advocate the concept of «Dominion» and feel that they are
part of Russia’s history and a unified society. This gives us reason to
state the following: regardless of actual ethnicity, the feeling of ethnic
solidarity strengthens Russians’ patriotism and, without exaggeration,
bolsters social optimism and mutual understanding.
The data collected during IS RAS monitoring gives us reason to
conclude that religious affiliation does not play a major role in perceiving
the sources of social threats, thus reaffirming the followers of traditional
religious denomination’s tendency to be more focused on defensive
imperatives.
In light of Russians’ current dispositions, the influence of a religious
worldview on understanding threats may be viewed as the interpretation
of Russia’s sustainability as a civilization through the prism of social,
cultural, and religious parameters. Even though Russians’ opinions are
dominated by the notion that threats mostly come from an external source,
the majority is still inclined to feel anxious about threats having a negative
social and economic impact within the country, while the danger posed
by religious extremism on a global level is pushed to the periphery. On
the other hand, Russian society is deeply troubled by potential conflicts
between different religious groups, which heightens the perception
of threats to social stability. In this context, it becomes clear that the
followers of Russia’s major religions share the same opinions, which
confirms that dialogue between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in
Russia has a substantial foundation.
Стр.414
414 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
As studies have shown, the religious factor does not influence
the choice of either short- or long-term social strategies, thus passing
unnoticed by the public consciousness as either a reason for tension or
the path of salvation. At the same time, the religious factor is multifaceted
in nature, which is demonstrated through different attitudes towards
the rise in activity of the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as through
different opinions on the social role of religious organizations and
different individual displays of faith. In some cases, this serves as definite
proof of there being significant worldview differences in society, in terms
of «the religious vs the secular»; whereas in other cases, this clearly shows
that the attitudes towards religious organizations’ social activity and
usefulness are a sign of society’s autonomy, which before now has not
been undermined even by religious institutions. Overall, the conclusion
would be as follows: as people search for ways to reduce the negative
impact of growing social tension, the subjective importance of turning to
God continues to grow.
Russians’ evaluation of interreligious relations in society confirms
the convergence of ethnic and religious traditions as the basis of
community life in Russia, while also reflecting the challenges faced by
social stability and value-based integrity. Despite the almost complete lack
of destructive open confrontation scenarios in the public’s evaluations,
around one-third of Russians still admit that there is a covert threat of
ethnic and religious tension.
Social stability and shared values largely depend on the way followers
of different religions and worldview principles interact with one another.
The emotional, historical, and prediction aspects show that there are
major shared vectors in people’s opinions, and the differences that do
arise have little to do with religion. Having different outlooks on life
and religious preferences does not disrupt the symbolic continuity of
the country’s history and values, but still sheds light on the current risks.
What we mean here is a slight drop in the share of positive attitudes
towards being filled with patriotism, the interpretation of the «Russian
question», and balancing multiple religions and ethnicities as a valuecentric
and political phenomenon.
At the same time, as we analyze the value-based historical projections
and the images of the desired future, we do not see any grave contradictions
in the opinions of different religions’ followers, which goes to show that
shared history and values provide a solid foundation. And even though
a design for Russia’s religious development is not among the top priorities in
the public consciousness, just as purely religious or ecclesiastical historical
symbols do not define the Russian people’s heritage, the concepts of
Стр.415
Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 415
“the Church» and «Faith» are currently of great importance, as they play
an important role in maintaining social stability.
Analysis of the life priorities of Russians in the IS RAS project reveals
that the focus on individualism, personal well-being, and self-fulfillment
continues to be relevant, and has even gained more prevalence during
the crisis. In contrast, the desire to interact with the outside world and
different types of communities, as well as the wish to work as a team,
remains less relevant. Russians’ perception of the new reality is dominated
by a diminished sense of security, a more vehement desire to fight against
glaring social inequality, and a readiness to make independent decisions
and act responsibly. Unlike people living in other European countries,
Russians view financial well-being and the respect of fellow community
members not as a life goal in itself but rather as the flip side of the scarcity
of these life aspects. Their perception of the country’s development
prospects, in turn, is dominated by striving for stability and returning to
tradition.
It is very important to emphasize that modern Russians do not view
tradition as something archaic; on the contrary, for them tradition is
something that lives on during different historical periods and is upheld
by certain social groups because it is reasonable, practical, and essential
from a spiritual and moral point of view. During the current crisis, just
like during the years before, Russian society has been exhibiting an
inclination towards reviewing a number of key values, with no less than
one-third of the population using tradition as guidance on a consistent
(or we can say systemic) basis. Interestingly enough, this process, with
all its internal divergence of sociopolitical dispositions, is typical of all
population groups, including the representatives of various ethnicities.
It is worth noting that the share of the population that gives more
weight to the current reality rather than tradition (primarily when it comes
to the issues and principles of everyday life) stably declines with age,
while reaching a maximum in the age cohort that is not too concerned
about having to adapt to the crisis. Similarly, adherence to tradition takes
prevalence with age (especially among people aged 60 or older) even in
the economically active cohorts, where the share of those who uphold
traditions is normally far below average.
It would be logical to assume that advocates of traditional views
support the development of Russia as an authoritarian state. On the other
hand, those people who systemically support modern values mostly
hail the development of democracy (with a European accent). We must
note that this group is also more likely to attract those who have not yet
taken a definite stance on the matter (the «midway» group). However,
Стр.416
416 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
our research has also revealed a reverse, even paradoxical, trend. When it
comes to choosing Russia’s main development path, the midway group
is more inclined to support the idea of Russia going its own way, which
is very strongly advocated by traditionalists (as opposed to following
the «European way»).
What is the reason behind this paradox? It could lie in the latest
events that have been occurring in Europe, which have almost completely
erased its reputation as a civilization with a balanced culture; as a result,
using the term «European» when talking of social development prospects
causes an idiosyncratic reaction in terms of both emotions and political
ideas.
It is quite evident that, just like all other people on Earth, Russians
strive towards prosperity, modern comforts, higher quality of life, and
greater well-being. However, they are not focused on the goal alone;
the means of reaching it are just as important. They value not only
material prosperity but also the conceptual side of well-being. In this
respect, the IS RAS research group saw once more that Russians’ social
attitude cannot be called purely material
a certain concept of self-respect based on the desire to be an achiever as
well as on values that stem from the idea of education and enlightenment.
And this interest is linked to the way Russians see themselves and, as
a result, gets intertwined with the issue of identity, and ultimately with
an inherent national worldview. That’s why the «proper», «successful»
modernization of the country, as Russians see it, will occur when Russia
will be able to earn money not only thanks to its mineral resources,
infrastructure, or strategically advantageous geographical location, but
also due to the intellect of its people.
Attempts to think about Russia’s future help reveal one of the most
in nature;
it also includes
prominent peculiarities of the Russian mentality, i.e. the close connection,
merging even, between a strong inclination towards modernization and
the traditionalist point of view. While being obsessed with scientific and
technical progress, Russian society is still deeply rooted in tradition.
That said, Russians’ tendency to support tradition is rational in nature.
This allows us to make significant adjustments to the familiar notion
that the behavioral patterns of modern Russians are based on the ideas
of collectivism and individualism. As convincingly demonstrated by the
scientific monitoring of the transformation processes in Russian society
(including, but not limited, to the research carried out by IS RAS),
Russians are no less individualistic than many citizens of developed
countries. The social history of Russia over the past fifty years has
been inextricably intertwined with the mass motivation to transition
Стр.417
Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 417
to a “consumer society», and thus may be regarded as the history
of individualistic values and of the way they developed and asserted
themselves. It is evident that the crises that modern Russia has had to live
through have not «dulled down» this trend; on the contrary, they have
made it even more relevant.
As the system of cultural norms and values drifts from collectivism
to individualism, we can distinguish two opposing worldview models:
activism and passivity. The followers of the first model, dubbed “super
activists» in IS RAS studies, are characterized by a high level of civic
involvement and a strong sense of responsibility. Those who adhere to
the second model, the so-called «everymen», tend to have a more inert
and superficial stance on life.
According to the results of this monitoring, super activists are very
committed to being self-sufficient, standing up for themselves, and finding
new things to learn. The everymen, on the other hand, tend to rely heavily
on government support and exhibit conservatism and even sycophancy.
There are also respondents that can be described as the «middle» group,
characterized by a combination of active and passive attitudes.
Interpretation of the results of our project gives us reason to believe
that in today’s Russia, the model of success revolves around a single
person and the way they build and protect their financial «castle», and
does not extend to the greater part of society or an attempt to incite social
changes. The only difference between the way this model is reproduced
by various generations is that young people (naturally, not all of them)
are removed from the «community» vision of success even further than
middle-aged or senior groups. It is noteworthy, however, that while super
activists rarely speak of unity, teamwork, or solidarity, they get involved
in the community far more often than the everymen, who declare their
commitment to the community and social priorities from the comfort of
their home, without taking practical action.
The data we have collected in the course of the monitoring waves carried
out in 2014–2016 allows us to say that there have been two parallel sets of
reasons that doubled the number of the poor during the crisis. On the one
hand, this rise in poverty was caused by «optimization» of the Russian
economy on the whole and industrial enterprises in particular, which
resulted in the least efficient yet qualified workers (mostly male) being
made redundant. On the other hand, the steep rise in prices combined
with stagnant wages (which mostly remained at a rather low level),
drove many people whose income had just recently slightly exceeded
the minimum wage (i.e. people barely above the poverty threshold) into
poverty by the end of the first crisis year.
Стр.418
418 Russian society and challenges of the time. Book Five
The monitoring data have also proved that
the state institutions
responsible for the social well-being of the community were not prepared
to reduce the risk of widespread mass poverty during the crisis. On the state
policy level, poverty continues to be viewed as, first and foremost, an
issue related to social benefits, not employment. Today’s crisis has shed
light on just how wrong this perception, just like the approach to fighting
national poverty, is.
The Russian middle class, in turn, has not been diminished
or driven into extinction by the consequences of existing in crisis
conditions (contrary to popular belief). At the same time, their overall
influence on the economy has manifested itself through negative trends
in the economic situation and employment of the middle strata of
society, which go back to the years before the crisis. We may observe
that people in this category, who were enjoying quite a comfortable
lifestyle at the end of the 2000s, have started to gradually lose their
privileges, despite there still being a sizable gap between them and
the rest of the population. At that, the Russian middle class has been
most adversely impacted by the deterioration of social support at work,
the increase in prices, being forced to cut down on the use of paid social
services and take on extra work of every type, and the resulting shortage
of free time.
But even so, the actual negative impact of the crisis on the middle
class proved to be much smaller than anticipated. As a consequence,
the size of the middle class remained the same (42–44%) and only
a small share of the middle class believed that they were now worse off
than before the crisis. As before, the dominating idea was that one had to
solve one’s problems on one’s own, and the daily coping practices in hard
times were usually based on rational strategies.
Even though many Russians are not satisfied with the state of nearly
all essential aspects of society’s existence, as well as (based on the most
widespread opinions) with their inability to directly influence authorities,
they nevertheless continue putting their trust in the government and do
not support any forms of deposing government leaders. The transition of
the situation in the country from crisis to post-crisis at the end of 2016
reflects a certain balance between the interests and capabilities of the state
and society. At the same time, the relations between the two entities are
growing more rational, influenced by the specific interests and actions of
those involved. On the one hand, this creates objective prerequisites for
developing state and community institutions, and on the other, it draws
more attention to the issue of balancing the rational and value-based
components of Russian society’s consolidation.
Стр.419
Summary of the sociological megaproject (instead of conclusion) 419
On the whole, analysis of the project results gives us reason to
believe that during the current crisis in Russia, the system of norms and
values typical of “neo-etacratic» societies continues to be dominant and
sustainable. The core of any such system is the special role of the state.
However, is far from being a sign of society longing for authoritarian rule
and, moreover, for a totalitarian regime. On the contrary, what we may
observe here is the image of society as the «Dominion», which has always
been a feature of Russian culture. According to this concept, the state
is inseparable from society, which, in turn, grants the government the
right to protect the people. Most Russians believe that turning this
model into reality requires complete solidarity within the community
and willingness to help those who are not as successful or have fallen
on hard times. This perception of society and patriotic devotion to the
«Dominion» is spread among the overwhelming majority of Russians (as
opposed to a limited number of specific social groups). The concept of
the «Dominion» is linked to the sense of unity and the feeling that every
person is part of a greater whole, the existence of which relies on sharing
the same worldview and basic norms and values.
Стр.420
Contributors
L.M. Drobizheva, A.V. Karavay, N.V. Latova, Yu.V. Latov, Yu.P. Lezhnina,
S.V. Mareeva, M.M. Mchedlova, V.V. Petukhov, R.V. Petukhov (Editor),
N.N. Sedova, I.N. Trofimova, N.E. Tikhonova
M.K. Gorshkov (Editor), A.L. Andreev, R.E. Barash, L.G. Byzov,
Scientific editor – N.N. Niks
Rossiiskoe obschestvo i vyzovy vremeni. Kniga 5 / [Russian society
and challenges of the time. Book Five] / [М.К. Gorshkov et al.];
edited by M.K. Gorshkov, V.V. Petukhov. – Moscow: Izdatelstvo
VES MIR, 2017. − 416 p.
ISBN 978-5-7777-0687-4
© Team of authors, 2017
© Institute of Sociology RAS, 2017
© Izdatelstvo VES MIR, lay-out, 2017
Г 76 Российское общество и вызовы времени. Книга пятая /
[М.К. Горшков и др.]; под ред. М.К. Горшкова, В.В. Петухова.
– М.: Весь Мир, 2017. − 424 с.
ISBN 978-5-7777-0687-4
В книге подведены итоги реализованного в 2014–2016 гг. социологического
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Стр.422
Научное издание
Российское общество и вызовы времени
Книга пятая
Горшков Михаил Константинович, Андреев Андрей Леонидович,
Бараш Раиса Эдуардовна, Бызов Леонтий Георгиевич,
Дробижева Леокадия Михайловна, Каравай Анастасия Вадимовна,
Латова Наталия Валерьевна, Латов Юрий Валерьевич,
Лежнина Юлия Павловна, Мареева Светлана Владимировна,
Мчедлова Мария Мирановна, Петухов Владимир Васильевич,
Петухов Роман Владимирович, Седова Наталья Николаевна,
Тихонова Наталья Евгеньевна, Трофимова Ирина Николаевна
Редактор: В.А. Демьянович
Художник: Е.А. Ильин
Верстка С.А. Голодко
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