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Петербургский исторический журнал  / №1 2017

Continuities and differences between Soviet and Russian foreign policies from the elite perspective, 1860–1928 (100,00 руб.)

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Первый авторKähönen
Страниц15
ID606566
АннотацияDespite the promise of equality in radical, socialist form, the Bolsheviks quickly became the nucleus of the new у elite and ruling class in the Soviet Union. A practical viewpoint regarding this result is founded on viewing the ж й revolution as a state-making process, instead of a complete upheaval of power structures. This allows us to compare continuities and differences between Imperial Russian and Soviet foreign policy, based on the roles of elites in their formulation. An overview of the foundations of Russian foreign policy from the mid-19th century is related to two cases of Soviet foreign policy, during the Russian civil war and the 1920s, respectively. The comparison shows a significant change from exclusive to inclusive elites. However, coherence remained high in both elites. Although both polities faced similar constraints, the solutions of the elites in addressing them differed radically.
УДК94(47).084«1917/1939»
Kähönen, A. Continuities and differences between Soviet and Russian foreign policies from the elite perspective, 1860–1928 / A. Kähönen // Петербургский исторический журнал .— 2017 .— №1 .— С. 143-157 .— URL: https://rucont.ru/efd/606566 (дата обращения: 25.04.2024)

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Петербургский исторический журнал № 1 (2017) УДК 94(47).084«1917/1939» A. Kдhцnen Continuities and differences between Soviet and Russian foreign policies from the elite perspective, 1860–1928 In his book «State and Revolution», Lenin explained his views on the character of the revolutionary state: how revolution changes social relations and transforms the functions of the state, which eventually withers away1 . <...> In order to understand the role of elites in the formation of early Soviet foreign policy, the Russian revolution needs to be observed as a state-building process. <...> This allows us to emphasize continuities in the creation of a new regime and a sovereign state, and the role of elites in it2 . <...> Not just any concentration of decision-making constitutes elite: it requires the emergence of a cohesive, unitary and self-conscious group3 . <...> The dissolution of the previous social order in Russia began from the 1860s after the emancipation of the serfs4 , and the creation of a new one by the Bolsheviks began after the civil war, during the 1920s. <...> As the Bolsheviks promised a socialist society, this makes it, firstly, important to relate their actions to the Marxist ideals they claimed to uphold, and secondly, to assess the position of the Bolshevik elite as the nucleus of a new ruling class. <...> Saint-Petersburg Historical Journal N 1 (2017) A. Kдhцnen 143 The themes of continuity and change, both in the elite position and foreign policy, can be addressed through the following questions: how did the process of structural change in Russian society influence the role of elites? <...> Defining Russian and Soviet political elite The main dimensions for observing both the Imperial and the Soviet elite are openness and coherence6 . <...> Here the definition of the Russian elite is based on Lieven, with 215 members in 1894–1914 in the State Council, appointed by the emperor. <...> The State Council was a consultative body for the ruler in budgetary and legislative matters. <...> After the 1906 constitution, the State Council became the upper house, receiving budgetary power and a veto on legislation. <...> Hereditary nobility had a 90 % share among the appointed members of the State Council during the period. <...> Regarding the whole group of 215, 34 % had university education and only 2 % had middle level education. <...> In practice, the categorizations of ethnicity were not often clear-cut, but were mostly based on the father’s recorded nationality. 72 % were <...>