

METAPHYSICA NOVA ET VETUSTA

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NOVA ET VETUSTA

*A RETURN TO DUALISM*

BY

SCOTUS NOVANTICUS

*SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND EXTENDED*



WILLIAMS AND NORGATE

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## PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

IN the first edition I dealt in a brief, if not perfunctory, way, with the mental experiences which precede the emergence of Reason, being anxious to hasten to my main argument. In this second edition I speak more fully of the phenomena of Feeling, and I have been led, in this connection, to modify my view as to the source of the consciousness of Being. This affects the language in several chapters, and has made necessary a revised statement of the categories.

The improvements and additions made I need not specify here, as they will speak for themselves. The argument of the book remains what it was, but the statement is fuller and largely recast. As to the argument itself, I would only add, in the words of Professor Seth,<sup>1</sup> "All that can be

<sup>1</sup> *From Kant to Hegel*, p. 66.

asked of philosophy is, by the help of the most complete analysis to present a reasonable synthesis of the world as we find it."

In his admirable *Study of Religion* Dr. Martineau criticises some of my positions. I have not formally replied to him; but, taking the advice of Professor Flint in *Mind*, I have, in view of Dr. Martineau's objections, written a little less concisely than in the first edition.

S. S. LAURIE.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH,  
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## PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION.

“EACH individual must go through a process of reflection for himself in order to realize [the definite principles at the root of knowledge]; but in so doing he rises above his mere individual experience and puts himself in the sphere of universal knowledge for Man. He unites himself with Mind in Humanity. There is no mere individualism in such a system: there is rather the lifting up of the individual from his narrow sphere to the realm of the universal and the eternal.”<sup>1</sup>

This quotation might almost serve by itself as a preface to the following Excursus, but I will add a few words:—

The synthesis required for the perception of objects was the aim of Kant’s Analytic, and he

<sup>1</sup> Professor Veitch’s *Hamilton*.