HOW WE THINK
BY
JOHN DEWEY
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
D. C. HEATH & CO., PUBLISHERS
BOSTON NEW YORK CHICAGO
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PREFACE
OUR schools are troubled with a multiplication of studies, each in turn having its own
multiplication of materials and principles. Our teachers find their tasks made heavier in that they have
come to deal with pupils individually and not merely in mass. Unless these steps in advance are to end
in distraction, some clew of unity, some principle that makes for simplification, must be found. This
book represents the conviction that the needed steadying and centralizing factor is found in adopting as
the end of endeavor that attitude of mind, that habit of thought, which we call scientific. This scientific
attitude of mind might, conceivably, be quite irrelevant to teaching children and youth. But this book
also represents the conviction that such is not the case; that the native and unspoiled attitude of
childhood, marked by ardent curiosity, fertile imagination, and love of experimental inquiry, is near,
very near, to the attitude of the scientific mind. If these pages assist any to appreciate this kinship and
to consider seriously how its recognition in educational practice would make for individual happiness
and the reduction of social waste, the book will amply have served its purpose.
It
is hardly necessary to enumerate the authors to whom I am indebted. My fundamental
indebtedness is to my wife, by whom the ideas of this book were inspired, and through whose work in
connection with the Laboratory School, existing in Chicago between 1896 and 1903, the ideas attained
such concreteness as comes from embodiment and testing in practice. It is a pleasure, also, to
acknowledge indebtedness to the intelligence and sympathy of those who coöperated as teachers and
supervisors in the conduct of that school, and especially to Mrs. Ella Flagg Young, then a colleague in
the University, and now Superintendent of the Schools of Chicago.
NEW YORK CITY, December, 1909.
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CONTENTS
CONTENTS ..............................................................................................................................................................3
PART ONE:THE PROBLEM OF TRAINING THOUGHT...................................................................................4
CHAPTER ONE....................................................................................................................................................4
WHAT IS THOUGHT? ......................................................................................................................................4
CHAPTER TWO.....................................................................................................................................................10
THE NEED FOR TRAINING THOUGHT.............................................................................................................10
CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................................................................17
NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT..........................................................................17
CHAPTER FOUR....................................................................................................................................................24
SCHOOL CONDITIONS AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT .......................................................................24
CHAPTER FIVE .....................................................................................................................................................29
THE MEANS AND END OF MENTAL TRAINING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THE LOGICAL............29
PART TWO: LOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS .....................................................................................................34
CHAPTER SIX........................................................................................................................................................34
THE ANALYSIS OF A COMPLETE ACT OF THOUGHT..................................................................................34
CHAPTER SEVEN.................................................................................................................................................39
SYSTEMATIC INFERENCE: INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION........................................................................39
CHAPTER EIGHT ..................................................................................................................................................48
JUDGMENT: THE INTERPRETATION OF FACTS............................................................................................48
CHAPTER NINE.....................................................................................................................................................55
MEANING: OR CONCEPTIONS AND UNDERSTANDING..............................................................................55
CHAPTER TEN ......................................................................................................................................................64
CONCRETE AND ABSTRACT THINKING.........................................................................................................64
CHAPTER ELEVEN...............................................................................................................................................68
EMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC THINKING .......................................................................................................68
PART THREE: THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT................................................................................................73
CHAPTER TWELVE..............................................................................................................................................73
ACTIVITY AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT..............................................................................................73
CHAPTER THIRTEEN...........................................................................................................................................79
LANGUAGE AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT ..........................................................................................79
CHAPTER FORTEEN............................................................................................................................................87
OBSERVATION AND INFORMATION IN THE TRAINING OF MIND...........................................................87
CHAPTER FIFTEEN..............................................................................................................................................93
THE RECITATION AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT................................................................................93
CHAPTER SIXTEEN..............................................................................................................................................99
SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................................99
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JOHN DEWEY
PART ONE:THE PROBLEM OF TRAINING
THOUGHT
CHAPTER ONE
WHAT IS THOUGHT?
§ l. Varied Senses of the Term
No words are oftener on our lips than thinking and thought. So profuse and varied, indeed, is
our use of these words that it is not easy to define just what we mean by them. The aim of this chapter
is to find a single consistent meaning. Assistance may be had by considering some
typical ways in which the terms are employed. In the first place thought is used
broadly, not to say loosely. Everything that comes to mind, that "goes through our
heads," is called a thought. To think of a thing is just to be conscious of it in any way
whatsoever. Second, the term is restricted by excluding whatever is directly presented;
Four senses
of thought,
from the
we think (or think of) only such things as we do not directly see, hear, smell, or taste. Then, third, the
meaning is further limited to beliefs that rest upon some kind of evidence or testimony. Of this third
type, two kinds — or, rather, two degrees — must be discriminated. In some cases, a belief is accepted
with slight or almost no attempt to state the grounds that support it. In other cases, the ground or basis
for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy to support the belief examined. This process is
called reflective thought; it alone is truly educative in value, and it forms, accordingly, the principal
subject of this volume. We shall now briefly describe each of the four senses.
I. In its loosest sense, thinking signifies everything that, as we say, is "in our heads" or that
"goes through our minds." He who offers "a penny for your thoughts" does not expect
to drive any great bargain. In calling the objects of his demand thoughts, he does not
intend to ascribe to them dignity, consecutiveness, or truth. Any idle fancy, trivial
Chance and
idle thinking
recollection, or flitting impression will satisfy his demand. Daydreaming, building of castles in the air,
that loose flux of casual and disconnected material that floats through our minds in relaxed moments
are, in this random sense, thinking. More of our waking life than we should care to admit, even to
ourselves, is likely to be whiled away in this inconsequential trifling with idle fancy and unsubstantial
hope.
Reflective
thought is
consecutive,
not merely a
sequence
In this sense, silly folk and dullards think. The story is told of a man in slight
repute for intelligence, who, desiring to be chosen selectman in his New England
town, addressed a knot of neighbors in this wise: "I hear you don't believe I know
enough to hold office. I wish you to understand that I am thinking about something or
other most of the time. "Now reflective thought is like this random coursing of things
through the mind in that it consists of a succession of things thought of; but it is
unlike, in that the mere chance occurrence of any chance "something or other" in an irregular sequence
does not suffice. Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a consequence — a
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HOW WE THINK
consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome, while each in
turn leans back on its predecessors. The successive portions of the reflective thought grow out of one
another and support one another; they do not come and go in a medley. Each phase is a step from
something to something — technically speaking, it is a term of thought. Each term leaves a deposit
which is utilized in the next term. The stream or flow becomes a train, chain, or thread.
II. Even when thinking is used in a broad sense, it is usually restricted to
The restriction
of thinring
to what
goes beyond
direct observation
matters
not directly perceived: to what we do not see, smell, hear, or touch. We ask
the man telling a story if he saw a certain incident happen, and his reply may be, "No,
I only thought of it." A note of invention, as distinct from faithful record of
observation, is present. Most important in this class are successions of imaginative
incidents and episodes which, having a certain coherence, hanging together on a
continuous thread, lie between kaleidoscopic flights of fancy and considerations
deliberately employed to establish a conclusion. The imaginative stories poured forth by children
possess all degrees of internal congruity; some are disjointed, some are articulated. When connected,
they simulate reflective thought; indeed, they usually occur in minds of logical
capacity. These imaginative enterprises often precede thinking of the close-knit type
and prepare the way for it. But they do not aim at knowledge, at belief about facts or
in truths; and thereby they are marked off from reflective thought even when they
most resemble it. Those who express such thoughts do not expect credence, but rather
Reflective
thought
aims,
how
ever, at belief
credit for a well-constructed plot or a well-arranged climax. They produce good stories, not — unless
by chance — quences of beliefs knowledge. Such thoughts are an efflorescence of feeling; the
enhancement of a mood or sentiment is their aim; congruity of emotion, their binding tie.
III. In its next sense, thought denotes belief resting upon some basis, that is, real or supposed
knowledge going beyond what is directly present. It is marked by acceptance or
rejection of something as reasonably probable or improbable. This phase of thought,
however, includes two such distinct types of belief that, even though their difference
is strictly one of degree, not of kind, it becomes practically important to consider them
separately. Some beliefs are accepted when their grounds have not themselves been
Thought
induces
belief in two
way
considered, others are accepted because their grounds have been examined.
When we say, "Men used to think the world was flat," or, "I thought you went by the house,"
we express belief: something is accepted, held to, acquiesced in, or affirmed. But such thoughts may
mean a supposition accepted without reference to its real grounds. These may be adequate, they may
not; but their value with reference to the support they afford the belief has not been considered.
Such thoughts grow up unconsciously and without reference to the attainment of correct belief.
They are picked up — we know not how. From obscure sources and by unnoticed channels they
insinuate themselves into acceptance and become unconsciously a part of our mental furniture.
Tradition, instruction, imitation — all of which depend upon authority in some form, or appeal to our
own advantage, or fall in with a strong passion — are responsible for them. Such thoughts are
prejudices, that is, prejudgments, not judgments proper that rest upon a survey of evidence.1
IV. Thoughts that result in belief have an importance attached to them which
Thinking in
its best sense
is that which
considers the
basis and
conse
leads to reflective thought, to conscious inquiry into the nature, conditions, and
bearings of the belief. To think of whales and camels in the clouds is to entertain
ourselves with fancies, terminable at our pleasure, which do not lead to any belief in
particular. But to think of the world as flat is to ascribe a quality to a real thing as its
real property. This conclusion denotes a connection among things and hence is not,
like imaginative thought, plastic to our mood. Belief in the world's flatness commits him who holds it
to thinking in certain specific ways of other objects, such as the heavenly bodies, antipodes, the
1 This mode of thinking in its contrast with thoughtful inquiry receives special notice in the next chapter.
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