Ельза Мария Каазбел доцент кафедры образования для учителей Университетский колледж VIA University College Denmark emk.lysbro@gmail.com “Discourse, Power, Resistance”: “Trust and Panic in Education” ”Angst” and trusted being” «Дискурс, Власть, Сопротивление»: «Доверие и Паника в образовании» Предъявляется философия образования, где приоритетными являются понятия "Bildung” and “Bildsamkeit”. <...> Trust ―Trust‖ is something we like to take for granted. <...> Trust is usually considered a basic condition in the understanding of humanity, as it has been formulated throughout the history of most traditions, - and here I am especially thinking of existential traditions in different cultures. <...> Here trust is related to the foundational dimensions of human existence, and this manifests as trust in life, in God or truth, in the other(-s) and eventually, as a consequence of alignment within these foundational dimensions, as trust in oneself. <...> As such trust is a prerequisite for the constitution of human subjectivity, which then makes it a basic ontological condition. <...> So, it is for good reasons that trust is a pivotal point both in the more solemn sense related to existential and religious philosophy and in the more common use in daily life of our modern time. <...> Ontological dimension trust is both a priori Trust in this dimension is an ontological-existential matter. <...> It means that - or before and ground - for human subjectivity (consciousness, mind and experience) and existence as being-in-the-world. <...> Without such a foundational trust it is not possible to constitute psychological space for the subject to generate and develop an ―I‖ or ―Self‖ in an existential – meaning: common, perhaps even universal - context, and thus as a conditioned being-in-the-world. 97 It is the kind of trust A. Giddens is indicating in his reflections on ontological security, by which he means “a sense of reliability of persons and things so central to the notion of trust, is basic to the feelings of ontological security”,(”Consequences…”, p. 147). <...> Giddens relates this sense of trust to both concrete relations (facework commitments) and in abstract systems (faceless commitments), and as such it is regarded an expression – or consequence – of modernity. <...> Ontologically there is no opposite to this kind of basic trust, as it is regarded an a priori condition before any other feeling or experience. <...> It is, though, a fact that people <...>