

WHY THE MIND HAS A BODY

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BY

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P R E F A C E

THE reader will find in this book (1) a sketch of an explanation of the connection of mind and body; (2) a proposal, based thereon, for a settlement of the controversy between the parallelists and the interactionists.

(1) The explanation of the connection of mind and body is not in substance new. It is that which is implied in the panpsychism of Fechner and Clifford. Brief expositions of it have been given by Paulsen in his *Einleitung in die Philosophie*—indeed, to Paulsen I owe my first acquaintance with it—and, more recently, by Stout in the chapter “Body and Mind” of his *Manual*. What specially characterizes my treatment of the matter is the detailed working-out of the conception in terms of the hypothesis of mental causality. I have also set forth somewhat elaborately the scientific and metaphysical premises on which it rests.

Perhaps owing to the brevity with which it has been presented, this explanation has thus far attracted little attention. Most philosophical writers seem not to have grasped it. They are accustomed to treat the connection of mind and body as inexplicable. So settled have they become in the belief that it cannot

be explained, that they have almost ceased to regard it as a fact needing explanation.

That the panpsychist explanation is clear to the bottom and altogether free from difficulties, I should be the last to pretend. But it rests on sound metaphysical principles; it enables us, as no other hypothesis does, to construe the facts; and its difficulties are of the nature of obscurities, not of contradictions. Hence I think panpsychists are justified in maintaining that with their principles they are able to explain the connection of mind and body. I have chosen my title with the object of putting this panpsychist pretension distinctly on record.

(2) A further merit of the explanation is that it enables us to settle the controversy between the interactionists and the parallelists in a way satisfactory to both parties. Parallelism is commonly supposed to deny the efficiency of mind; and this is felt to be the great objection to it. The proposition that, so far from denying efficiency, parallelism involves and implies it, may even seem to the reader a contradiction in terms. Yet this is a proposition which the panpsychist theory permits us to justify. Here again I am happy to find myself in agreement with Dr. Stout, who in the chapter of his *Manual* already referred to provides a basis for reconciliation between parallelists and interactionists identical with that proposed here.

In his article "Are We Automata?" in *Mind* for 1879 (vol. iv., pp. 1-22), Professor James made the prediction that, if the 'automaton theory' should